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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST, GEORGE, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
ELZA E. MILLER, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. 
1 CASE NO. 890428-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, §78-2A-3(2)(c) (Repl. Vol. 9 1987 Ed.) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal follows a non-jury verdict in Washington County 
Fifth Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 891000348, finding Appellant 
guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of U.C.A. 
§76-9-102(1) (b) (i), St. George City Code as adopted, an infraction. 
At the close of the State's case Appellant moved to dismiss for 
failure of the State to establish a prima facie case. That Motion 
was denied. 
Appellant testified and denied the allegations in the 
Information. 
Following the presentation of evidence the Court determined 
that no violence had occurred on the occasion and did not find that 
the Appellant's behavior was "tumultuous". However, the Court 
concluded that the evidence had established threatening behavior 
intended to cause a public inconvenience. The Appellant waived time 
and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500.00 with $400.00 suspended 
upon Appellant's successful completion of a one year probation. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
sustain a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had 
engaged in threatening behavior where the only evidence presented 
concerned statements made by Appellant and those statements were, 
for the most part, limited to expressions by Appellant of what ought 
to or could be done as opposed to a statement of intent to engage in 
specified conduct. 
2. Whether the Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to 
introduce a cassette tape containing a recording of statements made 
by one of the prosecution's witnesses, including a threat to the 
Appellant after the incident in question but prior to the date of 
trial, where said tape recording was offered to show bias, 
prejudice, and/or motivation to misrepresent, constituted error 
and/or a denial of Appellant's constitutional right to due process 
of law. 
3. Whether the Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to 
present evidence of confrontations between the alleged victims and 
the Appellant that had occurred on dates other than the date charged 
in the information and threats made to Appellant by those witnesses 
-2-
on prior occasions; in order to demonstrate bias, prejudice, or 
motivation to misrepresent and to establish Appellant's claim that 
his conduct was provoked, constitutes error, a denial of Appellant's 
right of confrontation, and/or a denial of due process. 
4. Whether U.C.A. §76-9-102 (1) (b) (i), insofar as it prohibits 
threatening behavior, constitutes an infringement on Appellant's 
Federal and State Constitutional rights to freedom of speech as 
applied where the evidence presented at trial concerning "threats" 
or "threatening behavior" of any kind, was limited to verbal 
statements by the Defendant. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution; 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution; 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution; 
U.C.A. §76-9-102(1) (b) (i); 
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
Rule 608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence; 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a non-jury verdict finding the Appellant 
guilty of disorderly conduct, an infraction. The facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review are: 
On or about the 19th day of March, 1989, (Transcript of Trial 
at 6, 20, and 28) or, according to Appellant, on March 5, 1989 
(Transcript of Trial at 42) , Appellant and four individuals, three 
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of whom testified at trial, engaged in a verbal altercation. During 
the course of that altercation, no weapon was ever displayed 
(Transcript at 31) , there was no physical fight between any of the 
parties (Transcript at 33) , and there was no violent conduct 
(Transcript at 34) . In its findings the Court found "that no 
violence occurred on this occasion." (Transcript at 65). The Court 
also refused to base its ruling on "tumultuous" conduct because 
these were "differences or nuisances in level of sound". 
(Transcript at 65). 
The prosecution's witnesses contradicted themselves with 
reference to the length of the verbal altercation. Two of the 
witnesses testified that the altercation lasted approximately a half 
an hour (Transcript of Trial at 10 and 30), while the other witness 
testified that the incident lasted approximately five to ten minutes 
(Transcript of Trial at 23). In addition, the prosecution's 
witnesses were not consistent when testifying with regard to the 
events that led up to the verbal altercation. One of the witnesses 
testified that the altercation started when one Bobby Randall, an 
individual who was not called by the prosecution to testify, 
approached a fence adjacent to the Appellant's property and the 
Appellant stated that if Mr. Randall came any closer that he would 
"blow his brains out." (Transcript of Trial at_ 9) . However, the 
other two witnesses did not mention any altercation with Bobby 
Randall. One of them testified that the incident started while Mr. 
Miller was attempting to tape record what the witnesses were saying 
at the time while Appellant stood on his own property (Transcript of 
Trial at 22) . The other witness testified that there was no tape 
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recording but that the altercation started when the Appellant 
started verbally accosting him and his companions while they were 
playing horse shoes. (Transcript of Trial at 29 and 32). Neither 
of the last two witnesses to testify mentioned any confrontation 
with Bobby Randall. 
Although Appellant denied having made any threatening comments 
to any of the addressees, (Transcript of Trial at 44 and 45) the 
witnesses stated that Appellant made various comments about a gun, 
including requesting that his wife go and "get the gun" (Transcript 
at 9 and 10) , or that he had a gun (Transcript of Trial at 22 and 
24). However, no weapon was displayed (Transcript of Trial at 11, 
12, 24 and 31). 
Appellant was alleged to have said that he "ought to do away 
with" the addressees (Transcript of Trial at 29), that he "ought to 
blow [the addressees1] off" (Transcript of Trial at 22), and that he 
"ought to blow [the addressees1] heads off" (Transcript of Trial at 
10) . Testimony was also presented that the Appellant had stated 
that he "could" cause the addressees injury (Transcript of Trial at 
24) and that he "wanted to" injure them (Transcript of Trial at 30) 
but no testimony was presented that the Appellant stated that he 
intended to or would cause any injury to any of the addressees who 
testified at trial. One of the witnesses testified that Appellant 
had stated to Bobby Randall that "if he came one step closer, he was 
going to blow his brains out," (Transcript of Trial at 9) but none 
of the other witnesses mentioned that incident. One of the 
addressees testified that Mr. Miller had said that he "was going to" 
injure them "with a gun" and, "had a shotgun" but on 
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cross-examination that witness admitted that the actual statement 
was "I ought to blow you all away and do away with you", (Transcript 
of Trial at 31). 
Each of the prosecution's witnesses testified at trial that 
Appellant's statements annoyed them (Transcript of Trial at 11, 23, 
and 30) . When asked whether the statements by Appellant alarmed 
him, the first of the prosecution's witnesses did not answer the 
question (Transcript of Trial at 11) , the second of the 
prosecution's witnesses did not answer the question (Transcript of 
trial at 23), and the third of the prosecution's witnesses stated 
that he was alarmed (Transcript of Trial at 31). 
Although the principal witness at trial denied any animosity 
toward Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 15) , the prosecution 
stipulated that there existed animosity on behalf of its witnesses 
toward the Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 50). 
Before trial Appellant raised two objections to the proceedings 
based on constitutional issues (Transcript of Trial at 3 and 4) . 
Appellant objected on the basis that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and that the statute constituted an 
impermissible infringement on his constitutional right to freedom of 
speech. The Court refused to consider either objection, ruling that 
the objections were untimely (Transcript of Trial at 4). 
At trial Appellant attempted to introduce evidence concerning a 
history of prior provoking conduct by the prosecution's witnesses, 
including evidence regarding threats to Appellant, in order to 
impeach the prosecution's witnesses and present Appellant's defense 
that his conduct was justified by provocation on the part of the 
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prosecution's witnesses. The Court denied Appellant the opportunity 
to do so "in the interest of time" and because the Court determined 
that impeachment of that nature would be "collateral" (Transcript of 
Trial at 14 and 15) , even though the prosecution had already 
presented evidence concerning prior confrontations between the 
parties (Transcript of Trial at 12) , and because evidence of 
provocation should be limited to the specific occasion at issue 
(Transcript of Trial at 40) . (It is interesting to note that the 
Court acknowledged being aware of prior incidents involving 
Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 65) refused to allow Appellant 
an opportunity to present evidence as to any of those matters). The 
Court also refused to allow Appellant * . present testimony 
concerning a threatening statement made one of the witnesses to 
Appellant between the date of the incident for which Appellant was 
on trial and the date of trial or a tape recording containing that 
statement, again ruling that specifics regarding that confrontation 
would constitute "collateral impeachment" since animosity had been 
conceded (Transcript al at 51). 
Following the presentation of evidence it 1 arguments of counsel 
the Court concluded that Appellant had not engaged in violent 
conduct. The Court did not find that Appellant had engaged in 
tumultuous conduct. However, the Court found that the Appellant was 
guilty of threatening behavior with the intent cause public 
inconvenience (Transcript of Trial at 65). 
This appeal followed. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant i- this case was convicted of the crime of 
disorderly conduct based on a finding by - Court that he had 
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engaged in threatening behavior. However, the evidence presented at 
trial does not sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
of that crime. Threatening behavior, an essential element of the 
crime, refers to conduct, not speech, and there was no evidence that 
Appellant engaged in any "threatening behavior". If, however, 
Appellantfs speech were considered "behavior", the statements by the 
Appellant concerning what he ought to or could do were not threats. 
A threat is a statement of intent. There was no expression of 
intent in this instance on which the Court could base a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 (c) provides that evidence may be 
introduced to show bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent. In 
this case, however, the Court refused to allow Appellant to present 
testimony concerning bias, prejudice, and motive to misrepresent on 
the part of the prosecution's witnesses. Appellant attempted to 
introduce evidence concerning prior confrontations between these 
parties, threats made by the prosecutor's witness against Appellant 
prior to this incident and a threat made by the prosecution's 
witness to Appellant just prior to trial. All of that evidence was 
excluded by the Court on the Court's determination that the esvidence 
involved collateral impeachment. While it may be that the evidence 
would not be admissible solely for the purpose of impeaching the 
witnesses if the testimony related to a collateral mattssr, the 
evidence should have been admitted for the purpose of demonstrating 
bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent in that the evidence 
clearly went to the issue of animosity between the parties and the 
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prosecution's witnesses desire t.u inflict adverse consequences on 
Appellant. 
Appellant, as the Defendant in a criminal case, is entitled to 
present a defense. The defense in this instance was provocation 
based on a series of altercations between the Appellant and the 
prosecution1s witnesses over a period of time. The Trial Court's 
refusal to allow Appellant to present evidence concerning prior 
confrontations between the Appellant and the witnesses denied 
Appellant an opportun * present that defense and therefore 
denied Appellant due process -f law : i^ ranteed hy the United 
States and the Utah State Constitutions. 
While it may be appropriate for the government to limit speech 
under certain circumstances, the Court1:, i uling in thi\;
 c a s e 
amounted to an unconstitutional denial of the Appellant's right to 
freedom of speech. There v finding by the Court that the 
statements made by Appellant were in any wa: -. r nbited by 
legitimate governmental concerns, Willi the exception of one 
uncorroborated statement, appellant- ! •,• alleged statements did not 
include an expression of any intent to cause harm but instead 
expressed an opinion as to what ought or could be done, A person's 
expression of what ought « t Mould be done is precisely the type of 
speech entitled to protection, even if that expression of opinion 
annoys the listener. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT ENGAGED IN 
THREATENING BEHAVIOR IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
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1. Statements by Appellant, even if of a threatening 
nature, are not "Threatening Behavior" as prohibited by UCA 
§76-9-102(1)(b)(i). 
Although one of the prosecution's witnesses, Mr. Pendleton, 
testified that "threats" were made (Transcript of Hearing at 10,11, 
and 12) , the testimony was clear that no weapon was ever displayed 
(Transcript of Trial at 11, 12, 24, and 31), and there was no 
evidence presented at trial that Appellant did anything that could 
even arguably be construed threatening except to speak. 
Threatening "behavior" is something far difference than speech. 
In State v. Cantwell, 676 P.2d. 353 (Or. App. 1984) the Oregon State 
Court of Appeals was asked to decide that Oregon Revised Statute 
166.025 (1) (a) constituted an unconstitutional infringement on 
freedom of speech because it made it a crime to engage in "fighting 
or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior" with the intent 
to cause or recklessly create a risk of, public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm. In response to that argument the Court of 
Appeals from the State of Oregon stated: 
We do not read the statute to encompass speech in the term 
"behavior" but construe it to refer only to physical acts 
of violence. ..."[Flighting "and" violent, tumultuous or 
threatening behavior" describe physical acts of 
aggression, not speech, and in prohibiting such physical 
acts ORS 166.025 (1) (a) does not run afoul of Article I, 
Section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. 676 P.2d. at 356. 
The rational of the Oregon State Court of Appeals, in 
distinguishing behavior from speech, should be applied to this 
case. This is especially so in light of the fact that there are 
other statutes that prohibit engaging in abusive language or making 
unreasonable noises. UCA §76-9-102 (1) (b) (iv) contains elements 
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different from those specified in the Information against 
Appellant, prohibiting abusive language in a public place i ntended 
to cause public annoyance or alarm and UCA §76-9-102 (1) (b) (iii) 
declares it unlawful to make unreasonable noises in a private place 
which can be heard in a public place intended to cause public 
annoyance or alarm. It is apparent that the legislature intended 
to draw a distinction between behavior and th^ use of language. In 
this instance, since the only evidence presented related to 
language, It was reversible error for the Trial Court to find that 
Appellant engaged in threatening "behavior". 
2. Since the Statements Made by Appellant Alleged to Have 
Been Threatening Were Expressions of Opinion as Opposed to 
Expressions of Intent, They Cannot Form the Basis for a Conviction 
of Engaging in "Threatening" Behavior. 
In Harline vs. Campbell, 728 P.2d. 980 (Utah 1986) the Court 
reaffirmed the rule that the factual findings-. t tin; Trial Court 
will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record in the 
evidence to support them. case, the Court indicated that, 
in order to obtain review of a factual finding of the Trial Court, 
the Appellant must marshall all evidence in support of the Trial 
Court's finding and \.\\<*w demonstrate that even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the factual determination made - .-; Trial 
Court, the evidence is insufficient to support its findings. Even 
with that standard of revi ew, the Trial Court's determination that 
the Appellant engaged in "threatening" behavior is error and must 
be reversed. 
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The nature of Appellant's statements, according to the 
testimony at trial, fell into the following categories: 
1. Statements that the Appellant "oughu to" do something to 
harm the alleged victims (Transcript of Trial at 10,22, and 29); 
2. Statements that the Appellant "could" cause the alleged 
victims harm (Transcript of Trial at 24); 
3. Statements that the Appellant "wanted to" injure the alleged 
victims (Transcript of Trial at 30) ; 
4. Statements that the alleged victims ought to hurt 
themselves (Transcript of Trial at 17); 
5. One statement, unsupported by the testimony of any other 
witness, that the Appellant had said that if Bobby Randall came any 
closer the Appellant was going to cause him physical injury 
(Transcript of Trial at 9); 
6. A statement that the Appellant was "going to" cause the 
alleged victims harm. However, on cross-examination, this 
statement was clarified. The witness testified that the actual 
statement was that the Appellant "ought to" cause them injury 
(Transcript of Trial at 31). 
The testimony presented at trial simply does not support a 
finding by the Court that the Appellant engaged in "threatening" 
behavior. A threat is defined "as an expression of an intention to 
hurt, destroy, punish etc". Webster's New World Dictionary, 2d 
College Edition (C. 1980 by Simon and Schuster, Division of Gulf 
and Western Corporation) at Page 1482. Although Appellant's 
statements were characterized as threats by the prosecuting 
attorney and by certain of the prosecution's witnesses, the only 
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statement that could arguably be construed to be, a threat was a 
statement testified to by Mr. Pendleton that the Appellant had 
stated that if one Bobby Randall came closer then the Appellant was 
"going to blow his brains out". However, none of the other 
witnesses, allegedly present during uhe entire incident (Transcript 
of Trial at 26 and 29-36), testified to a similar statement, While 
Mr. Pendleton's testimony may provide a "scintilla" of evidence 
concerning a threatening statement, that statement, unsupported by 
any corroboration from the prosecution 1s other witnesses who were 
there during the entire I line I. In-- uiddeni .illegedly occurred, does 
not rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
especially in light of the Appellant's denial that any threats were 
made (Transcript of Trial at >H and -I')) .Hid hi . Pendleton's 
conceded, although denied, animosity toward Appellant. 
B. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE 
WITNESSES' BIAS, PREJUDICE, OR MOTI M I S-<E; RESENT AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
DO SO. •• • -.. • 
Appellant was in possession of a tape recording mi wlin h the 
witness was recorded as having said: "I'm going to hang your ass, 
old mar referring to the Appellant and attempted to introduce 
that tape. Appellant attempted to intiwduce evidence concerning 
other threats by the prosecution's witnesses and earlier 
confrontations between the parties. Those offers to present 
evidence were denied, 
kule on.'Ur), Nt.ah Rules of Evidence provides: 
EVIDENCE OF BIAS. Bias, prejudice or any .-..-t, -> 
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misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either 
by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise 
adduced. 
As stated in State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d. 200 (Utah 1987): 
Evidence of bias or motive is not introduced for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting a witnesses general 
credibility, though it may have that effect. Rather, 
evidence of bias or motive is "always relevant as 
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 
testimony". (Citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 US 308, 316 
(1974)). 
The Court in State v. Hackford went on to state that: 
"If a prior instance of conduct is relevant to a 
witness's bias or motive to testify differently than would 
otherwise be the case, evidence pertaining to that conduct 
is not subject to exclusion under Rule 608 (b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence". 737 P. 2d. at 203. 
The Trial Court erred in not allowing Appellant to introduce 
evidence to show the adverse witnesses' bias, prejudice, or motive 
to misrepresent even though the Trial Court found that there was 
animosity. The Trial Court's finding of animosity should not 
deprive Appellant the opportunity to show the extent of that 
animosity. 
The Trial Court found that there was animosity, but not enough 
to make a difference, based apparently on knowledge acquired 
elsewhere and on the concessions of the prosecutor, but determined 
that there was not an adequate basis to show that the prosecution's 
three witnesses had fabricated (Transcript of Trial at 65). 
Unfortunately, it was the ruling of that Court on evidentary issues 
that precluded Appellant from presenting the very proof the Court 
found lacking. 
The Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to impeach the 
prosecution's witness and to present evidence concerning bias, 
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prejudice, or motive to misrepresent and then the Trial Court's 
specific finding that there was no adequate basis to show that the 
prosecution's witnesses' testimony had been fabricated amounts to a 
denial of Appellant's right to due process of law as guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. 
In addition/ where Defendant in a criminal case has been denied 
an opportunity to affectively impeach the prosecution's witness by 
presenting evidence concernir : ->ias , pre jud i ::e or a mot :i ^  re to 
misrepresent, the right to confront those witnesses is stripped of 
any real substance. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution provides that the accused in cruiunal prosecutions has 
the right to "be confronted by the witnesses against him,. " If 
cross examination of those witnesses is limited as to deny the 
Appellant a n < oportunity to present evide: ,• £ bias, prejudice or a 
motive to misrepresent then that right to confront is no more than a 
hollow ritual as opposed to a meaningful constitutional right. 
Appellant' s sonstitutioi lal right tc sonfroi it the wi tnesses and 
provide sufficient information to the Court to fully assess the 
witnesses' bias and prejudice towards the Appellant were compromised 
when the Trial Judge refused allow Appellant to cross-examine the 
witnesses concerning prior confrontations with Appellant and refused 
to admit the witnesses' tape recorded threat to the Appellant. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERR ED WHEI I IT REFUSED TO ALLOW THE 
APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF PROVOCATION BY THE 
ALLEGED VICTIMS AS A DEFENSE TO THE CHARGE OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT. 
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Under appropriate circumstances, sufficient provocation may 
justify acts or words otherwise punishable as disorderly conduct:* 
12 Am, Jur. 2d, Breach of Peace, §39 at 6 91. While the Trial Court 
did not directly deny the validity of that defense, the Trial Court 
did refuse to allow Appellant an opportunity to present evidence 
with regard to provocation except provocation which occurred on the 
date of the occurrence. 
The Trial Court, obviously interested in moving this case along 
as quickly as possible, refused to hear testimony with regard to any 
prior confrontations between the alleged victims and Appellant. The 
Trial Court apparently acknowledged that if the Appellant could 
demonstrate provocation on the date of the incident in question that 
that provocation could be a defense. However, the Trial Court 
limited the Appellant to the presentation of that defense in a 
vacuum, without the additional information and insight which could 
be obtained by considering the history of the parties1 conflict. 
In this case the Appellant alleged that his comments were 
provoked by comments from the addressees. The addressees were all 
friends who admittedly have animosity toward the Appellant. In 
order to assist the trier of fact in assessing credibility in a 
situation of that nature, evidence of prior confrontations between 
the parties, involving provocation by the alleged victims, is most 
certainly relevant and should be admitted (Rule 402 Utah Rules of 
Evidence) but, in addition, evidence of prior provoking conduct by 
the alleged victims was most certainly relevant to demonstrate 
justification for verbal retaliation on the date in question. 
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It would make life very simple if each instance of conduct 
could be viewed in a vacuum. IJnfortunatel\, specific instances of 
conduct are often the result of a pattern of behavior. In this case 
the Appellant alleged that there had been a history of provoking 
conduct by the alleged victims. Appellant maintains that the 
totality of that relationship should be considered in determining 
whether or not the instance in question was provoked. 
Appellant's opportunity to present a meaningful defense was 
denied when the Trial Court refused him an opportunity to inquire 
into and present evidence concerning pr i or provocatioi 
The Trial Court's error in limiting the presentation of 
Appellant's defense denied Appellant due process of law as 
guaranteed try tl le U1 : a 1 1 and I: .he I Jn i ted States Constitutions (Utah 
State Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IN THIS CASE AMOUNTS TO A DENIAL 
OF THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS GUARANTEED BY 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution provides 
as follows: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech... 
The First Amende . .-. -a ,-..; -.: -t.-j ; * . ;. ^ ides 
as follows: 
Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech... 
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The United States Supreme Court has allowed the prevention and 
the punishment of speech only if the speech falls in one of three 
categories: 
1. If the speech presents a "clear and present danger" of 
imminent violence or breach of peace, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 US 
1, 4, 69 S. Ct. 894, 895, 93 L. Ed., 1131 (1948); 
2. When the speech consists of "fighting words" Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942); 
3. When the speech advocates criminal activity, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 US 444, 89 S. Ct., 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969). 
In this case there was no evidence presented that Appellant's 
statements presented a clear and present danger of imminent violence 
or a breach of the peace. There was no testimony that Appellant 
made any aggressive movement toward any of the alleged victims. The 
testimony indicated that no weapon was displayed (Transcript of 
Trial at 11, 12, 24 and 31). Although each of the alleged victims 
testified that he was annoyed by what the Appellant said (Transcript 
of Trial at 11, 23 and 30) none of them testified as to any 
circumstances which would give rise to a finding that there was a 
clear and present danger of imminent violence or a breach of the 
peace. As the Supreme Court stated in Terminiello v. Chicago: 
"•..[F]reedom af speech, though not absolute, [citing 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Supra] is nevertheless 
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown 
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 337 US at 4. 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within 
the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only 
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when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to 
excite the addressee to a breach of the peace..." 315 U.S. 
at 573. 
In this instance there was no testimony at trial suggesting that 
the statements alleged to be made by Appellant were "plainly tending 
to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace." Quite to the 
contrary, although the addressees were annoyed, Mr. Pendleton's self 
serving testimony at trial was that, in response to Mr. Miller's 
statements, they "talked back to him.. .saying, 'calm down Mr. 
Miller,'...we weren't making no threats, or anything back towards 
him." (Transcript of Trial at 11). 
In Brandenburg vs. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that: " 
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a state to prohibit or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
eminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action." 395 US at 447. 
In this instance the Appellant's alleged statements as to the 
appropriateness of "blowing" the addressees away or his statement of 
opinion as to his own ability to do so were not of such a nature as 
to advocate criminal conduct likely to incite or produce such action. 
In this case nearly all of the statements the Appellant is 
alleged to have made were expressions of opinion. His statements 
consisted of what ought to or could be done. Statements of what 
ought to or could be done fall within the category of statements 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In finding the Appellant guilty of disorderly conduct 
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by expressing those opinions, the Trial Court's ruling amounts to a 
denial of this Appellant's right to freely express his opinion, a 
ienial of his freedom of speech as guaranteed by the United States 
and the Utah State Constitutions* 
VIII, CONCLUSION 
The Appellant in this case did not engage in any threatening 
behavior. He made statements* With the exception of the allegation 
Df one witness, uncorroborated by any others, none of the statements 
could even arguably be considered threats. The statements were 
expressions of opinion, not expressions of intent. They are 
accordingly protected as free speech under the United States and 
Utah State Constitutions and are not statements for which the 
Appellant can be found guilty of committing a crime. 
The Trial Court erred when it refused Appellant the opportunity 
to present testimony and evidence in an effort to show bias, 
prejudice, or motive to misrepresent on the part of the 
prosecution's witnesses and when it refused to allow the Appellant an 
opportunity to present the theory of this case, that is, 
justification based on provocation. 
Finally, Appellant cannot be found guilty of threatening 
"behavior" when all he did was speak. 
By reason of the Trial Court's errors, Appellant respectfully 
submits that the decision of the Trial Court, finding Appellant 
guilty of the crime of disorderly conduct, should be reversed and 
remanded with instructions to discharge Appellant (see State vs. 
Sorenson, 758 P.2d. 466 (Ut. App. 1988), or, at the very least, 
Appellant should be granted a new trial consistent with due process 
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and be permitted an opportunity to present the theory of his case and 
to present evidence regarding bias, prejudice, or motive to 
misrepresent on the part of the prosecution's witnesses. 
BATED this day of September, 1989. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
By; / 
G. Michael Weatfall 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing document, postage pre-paid on this day of 
September, 1989, to the following: 
Theodore W. Shumway 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Secretary 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-102. Disorderly Conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous 
or physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof; 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous 
or, threatening behavior; or. 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He enages in abusive or obscene language or 
makes obscene jestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place, " for the purpose of this section, means 
any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public 
has access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and 
the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office 
buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a Class C Misdemeanor if the offense 
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an 
infraction. 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech or of the press; or of the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of 
grievances. 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
No person shall...be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution. 
No person shall be deprive of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12, Utah State Constitution. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to...be confronted by the witnesses against him.... 
Article I, Section 15, Utah State Constitution, 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 40 2: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 608(c): 
Bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, ST. GEORGE DEPT. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELZA E. MILLER 
1925 West 1700 North 
St. George, Utah 
Defendant(s) 
Bail $ 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
Criminal Mo. 391000348 
The undersigned complainant under oath, scares on 
information and belief that che defendant committed the crime(s) 
of: 
Defendant, Sl^a E. Miller, did engage in violent, tumultuous or 
threatening behavior intended to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or recklessly creating a risk thereof, in violation of 
Sec. 76-9-102(b) (i) , St. George City Code as adopted. This is an 
infraction . 
DATE: March 5, 1989 or March 19, 1989 
PLACE: 1926 West 1700 North, St. George, Utah 
This information is based on evidence from these witnesses: 
John B. Hopkins, Don Pendleton, Donny Ward, Bobby Randall, Robert 
Pendleton, Rudy Torres, Randy Benson 
Filin 
T. W. Shumway 
Complainant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
Date : 
Circuit Judge 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELZA E MILLER 
1926 West 1700 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 891000343 
The above matter having come on for trial before the Court 
on Defendant Elza E Miller's plea of not guilty to charges of 
violating Sec. 76-9-102 (b) (i) , St. George City Code as adopted, 
the Defendant being present and represented by counsel, and the 
Court having heard the evidence presented by the parties, 
Good cause appearing, Defendant Elza E Miller is found and 
adjudged to be guilty of the charge against him. The Defendant 
waived his right for a sentencing delay, and a fine of $500 is 
imposed, $100 of the same to be paid within 30 days of the date 
of the trial. The remaining $400 of the same is suspended for a 
period of one year on conditions that Defendant obey a 
restraining order issued by the Court not to display or make 
reference to his guns and that Defendant is not to talk with the 
neighbors that are involved in this case. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 25tn day of May, 1989 
Rooert. F. Owens 
Circuit Court Judge 
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